Liverpool’s Form: Are They Back to Their Best?

Entering the current campaign, Liverpool was regarded as a marginal front-runner in the Premier League, though reflections suggest considerable uncertainties surrounding the team during the off-season.

The poignant loss of Diogo Jota brought an immeasurable absence, influencing the team profoundly in ways that remain largely inscrutable. In addition to this, numerous other shifts occurred.

Trent Alexander-Arnold, frequently celebrated as one of the most gifted passers to grace the sport, transitioned to Real Madrid. The dynamic prowess of Luis Díaz, known for pressing and skillful maneuvers, was acquired by Bayern Munich. The unpredictable flair and creative force of Darwin Núñez relocated to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, several reliable reserve players also secured new contracts, including Harvey Elliott at Aston Villa, Kostas Tsimikas with AS Roma, Jarell Quansah joining Bayer Leverkusen, and Caoimhín Kelleher moving to Brentford.

Significant talent also arrived. Liverpool twice shattered the Premier League transfer record, initially with Florian Wirtz from Bayer Leverkusen and later with Alexander Isak from Newcastle United. The notably Isak-like Hugo Ekitike was recruited from Eintracht Frankfurt. Two promising young fullbacks were added: Jeremie Frimpong, also from Wirtz’s Leverkusen, and Milos Kerkez from AFC Bournemouth. Giovanni Leoni, a towering teenage center back from Parma, was enlisted to fill Quansah’s position. Moreover, Giorgi Mamardashvili, stepping in for Kelleher, officially joined after a season-long loan at Valencia.

For a squad that confidently secured a Premier League title and pushed the ultimate UEFA Champions League victors to a penalty shootout the prior season, such extensive change marks a significant reset. While the preceding roster proved capable of winning the league and contending for the European Cup, and despite expectations that the new roster, given the reputations of the acquired players and Liverpool’s aptitude for player acquisition, could achieve similar success, definitive assurance remained elusive.

After the initial five Premier League fixtures, confidence appeared to solidify as Liverpool triumphed in all matches, swiftly establishing a five-point advantage over their closest competitor – matching the largest lead at that stage in league history. However, nine games in, the perception altered dramatically as the team endured four consecutive defeats, a first in four years, finding themselves trailing Arsenal by seven points.

The season seemingly faced insurmountable challenges, only to witness Liverpool’s two standout performances: a 2-0 victory against Aston Villa and a 1-0 shutout against an almost complete Real Madrid lineup. While the new acquisitions seemingly set the stage for Liverpool’s future, the team seemingly rediscovered its rhythm by returning to the strategies of the previous year.

To what extent has Liverpool struggled this season?

Below is the Premier League order according to adjusted goal difference, a favored metric for assessing team strength, combining 70% expected goals (xG) with 30% actual goals.

Arsenal stands alone at the summit, followed by Manchester City in second, with Liverpool grouped alongside teams like Crystal Palace, Chelsea, and Brighton & Hove Albion.

A deeper dive into offensive and defensive statistics reveals the following comparison for Liverpool across the past two seasons:

– Adjusted goals scored: 2.22 in 2024-25, 1.75 in 25-26
– Adjusted goals conceded: 1.04 in 2024-25, 1.29 in 25-26

Excluding the last four matches of the previous season, after Liverpool had secured the title and celebrations took precedence over training, the adjusted goals conceded figure reduces to 0.88.

Their schedule has presented considerable challenges, with matches against eight of the Premier League’s top 12 teams, according to betting-market-derived power ratings from Pitch Rank. The two matches against teams outside this elite group were both away games.

However, these factors do not fully account for the discrepancy between this and the previous year. A significant decline is evident across both offensive and defensive aspects of the game.

What contributed to this downturn?

Given that Arne Slot remains at the helm, the changes in personnel likely serve as the primary explanation for the difference between this and the last season. The following lists the percentage of Premier League minutes played by all departed players from the previous season:

– Díaz: 70.1%
– Alexander-Arnold: 69.2%
– Jota: 35.0%
– Núñez: 33.1%
– Kelleher: 26.3%
– Tsimikas: 24.5%
– Quansah: 14.5%
– Elliott: 10.8%

The distribution of minutes among the new players is as follows:

– Kerkez: 73.3%
– Wirtz: 67.4%
– Ekitike: 64.1%
– Mamardashvili: 40.0%
– Isak: 27.9%
– Frimpong: 9.6%
– Leoni: 0.0%

Beyond these arrivals and departures, noteworthy adjustments have also occurred among returning players. Cody Gakpo has featured in 88% of league minutes, compared to just over half the minutes the prior year. Dominik Szoboszlai has played every minute this season, up from approximately three-quarters of the minutes last season, while Conor Bradley has increased his playing time to roughly half the available minutes, a substantial rise from just over 20% the previous year.

Conversely, Andrew Robertson has seen the most significant reduction in playing time, down to just over a quarter of the minutes from nearly 75% last season. While no other player has experienced such a dramatic decrease, several minor declines have occurred in the same area of the field, with midfielders Ryan Gravenberch (from over 90% to around 75%), Curtis Jones (from half to just over a third), and Alexis Mac Allister (from around 75% to just over 60%) all seeing less time on the field.

Overall, this reformulated, and presently underperforming, Liverpool squad incorporates several distinct elements: a different left back than Robertson, a different full back other than Alexander-Arnold, a midfield often lacking Mac Allister, Jones, or Gravenberch, Gakpo as the regular left winger, and a new center forward.

Center forwards will always change, and the prospect of Alexander-Arnold returning is remote, despite his brief appearance on Tuesday. However, Liverpool’s improved performances in the last two matches coincide with adjustments to many of these changes. Robertson started both matches, and Bradley, the backup right back from last season, also started on the opposite side. The midfield consisted of Szoboszlai, Mac Allister, and Gravenberch, playing almost every minute except when Jones substituted Mac Allister against Madrid. Furthermore, Gakpo’s playing time has reverted to about half the minutes – similar to last season.

How much alteration is too much?

A review of Liverpool’s significant personnel decisions over the last 10 months reveals inconsistencies. They extended substantial contracts to their two standout players over 30, Virgil van Dijk and Mohamed Salah. Yet, they could not retain Alexander-Arnold, a 27-year-old star. Subsequently, they signed outfield players this past summer aged 26, 24, 23, 22, 21, and 18.

In essence, they have two more years to maximize the contributions of arguably the two best players in their positions in Premier League history. Moreover, they allocated more resources to transfer fees in a single window than any other club in the sport’s history. However, the bulk of this investment targeted players not yet within the 24-28 prime age range, with Isak, at 26, as the primary exception aligning with the Salah and Van Dijk timeline.

Their approach seemingly aimed to build Liverpool’s next dominant team while ensuring these players contribute during the final years of the existing one. Yet, even the strongest team’s foundation can only withstand so many simultaneous changes.

Soccer hinges on interdependencies – subtle connections across the field that collectively forge a team’s style or tactics.

Liverpool clinched the league title the prior season with a more measured style than that promoted by Jürgen Klopp. While they did not dominate possession as much as they had in the past, they also did not press as intensely, developing into a more resilient defensive unit despite allowing opponents into their attacking third with greater frequency. Their proficiency in this style was also aided by a generational passing talent in Alexander-Arnold and Salah, who performed as the world’s best player for a considerable portion of the season. These individuals are capable of producing a similar number of scoring opportunities even with fewer possessions.

Their success hinged significantly on their midfield, the area where Slot implemented a significant change by deploying Gravenberch as a mainstay at the base. While the three midfielders may not be considered elite passers or defenders, their competency across all aspects of midfield play – passing, moving, carrying, pressing, and recovering – proved sufficient. This balance enabled Liverpool to defend deep, press high, initiate swift counterattacks, or sustain prolonged periods of possession.

However, they then lost Alexander-Arnold and his deep-lying passing ability. Salah aged another year. Wirtz joined the midfield, introducing a degree of inflexibility. Kerkez assumed the position of new left back, and while possessing pace, he lacks Robertson’s passing range. Instead of occasional appearances and crashing the back post, Gakpo became a high-involvement, high-volume winger as a starter. Whoever occupies the center-forward position, neither can apply pressure as effectively as Jota, Díaz, or Núñez.

Adjusting to one change, such as the loss of Alexander-Arnold, becomes manageable by reallocating responsibilities across the team, as all other factors remain consistent. However, Liverpool faced the simultaneous loss of Alexander-Arnold, the replacement of Robertson, the abandonment of the previous season’s midfield, the transition of a backup winger into a starting role, and a complete overhaul of the center-forward position.

Comprehending the cumulative effects of these changes is challenging, but the clear outcome was a team that lost both its ability to control the ball and its defensive resilience. Despite the abundance of attacking talent, Liverpool struggled to consistently advance the ball into the final third, resulting in fewer shots and fewer touches inside the box.

Upon losing possession, the opposition needed only to launch long balls and exploit the openings. This season, Liverpool has faced 62 long balls per 90 minutes – a 15-pass increase from last season, representing the highest number faced by any team in the last four Premier League campaigns.

The lineup Slot deployed against Madrid, however, indicated a more controlled amount of change to maintain competitiveness. This was against one of the top five teams globally, and the performance surpassed even the positive result:

The Mac Allister, Szoboszlai, and Gravenberch midfield represents the team’s only area where all players are either in their prime or approaching it. It served as a strength the previous year and should continue to do so, particularly with Szoboszlai demonstrating potential to become one of the league’s best players. That trio provides Liverpool with just enough defensive stability without requiring complete domination of possession, yet remains technically adept enough to control possession.

Across the back four, the center backs are established choices at this point. Assisted by the midfield’s stability, Bradley delivered his two best performances of the season, able to make runs forward to open up space for Salah, or to advance the ball forward. On the left, Robertson might not be able to play every game, but he remains a better option than Kerkez, who is somewhat unpredictable in possession and does not complement Bradley on the opposite side.

In the front three, Wirtz might not generate as many shots for himself as Gakpo, but he’s far more reliable with the ball at his feet. Playing him as part of the midfield results in Liverpool being a much more open transition-focused team, whereas playing him in addition to the midfield improves the team’s security on the ball and creates all sorts of new opportunities for creating chances. Wirtz didn’t take a shot against Madrid, but he created five chances and was on the field for almost all 17 of Liverpool’s shots.

Salah, while unlikely to replicate his performance from last season, has shown improvement in the last two matches. After attempting 19 take-ons and completing just four in the first 11 Premier and Champions League games, he attempted 18 and completed 10 against Madrid and Villa. Liverpool’s pass maps last year favored Salah and Alexander-Arnold. What we observed on Tuesday could be the key to maximizing Salah’s contribution moving forward:

This does not imply that all issues have been resolved, as it is only two games. The team still seems significantly reliant on Gravenberch’s presence for the midfield to function effectively. Frimpong represents a completely different proposition than Bradley, who has struggled with injuries early in his career. It is November, and Salah’s attacking output is half of what it was the previous season. This formation excludes either Isak or Ekitike, and the consequences of injuries to Van Dijk or Ibrahima Konaté remain unknown.

Furthermore, Villa and Madrid did not truly test Liverpool’s vulnerability against long balls, a test unlikely to come against Manchester City this coming Sunday.

The team displayed in the last couple of games appears more logically constructed than the chaotic formation that defined the initial three months of the season. That was a different team than the one that did so well last year. And while this current iteration does still feel different, it’s more of an evolution from last season, rather than something totally new.

It is doubtful that anyone at the club envisioned this scenario at the end of the summer. Otherwise, a version of this XI would have been visible from the outset. It seems illogical to sign two strikers and an attacking midfielder if the long-term plan involves a formation where the attacking midfielder slot is already filled and only one forward can play. This configuration only creates room for two of the five new outfield signings. The reality dictates that Salah and Van Dijk are still on the team, Slot’s chosen midfield from last season was too effective to disrupt, and it was difficult not to perceive a group of 11 players capable of challenging for another Champions League title while watching Tuesday’s match.

For now, Liverpool may need to revisit the past to advance into the future. A new version of this team is hidden within this roster, one that will combine most of the new guys on the field together and plays at a high level. But it’s already November, and we still haven’t seen it.

Regarding the team that played against Madrid, their capabilities are mostly established.