It feels like just yesterday when securing exceptional coaching talent meant looking no further than Australia or New Zealand. Often, this simple search would yield significant acquisitions, like Andy Friend at Connacht, Chris Boyd at Northampton, or Pat Lam, whether on Ireland’s west coast or England’s west country. No extensive search was necessary; a straightforward approach was sufficient to land such valuable individuals.
Internationally, Australia, under the guidance of Bob Dwyer (1988-1995) and Rod Macqueen (1997-2001), followed by New Zealand with the pioneering work of Graham Henry, Steve Hansen, and Wayne Smith (2004-2019), steered the global rugby landscape during the initial stages of professionalism. These nations claimed the majority of World Cup titles, showcasing their worldwide dominance in advanced coaching knowledge across every tier of the sport.
The only brief break in this coaching supremacy was in 2003, when Clive Woodward put together an England coaching staff featuring at least three world-class experts: Phil Larder for defence, Dave Alred for kicking, and Dave Reddin for strength and conditioning. Similarly, the Springboks’ 2007 victory might not have happened without Eddie Jones serving as a crucial advisor to Jake White, shaping South African rugby’s strategic direction. Currently, New Zealander Tony Brown plays a comparable advisory role for Rassie Erasmus.
The influx of top-tier coaches from the Southern Hemisphere to the Northern Hemisphere has significantly decreased; paradoxically, Australia and New Zealand are now actively seeking fresh coaching talent themselves.
Recently, Jones talked about the Wallabies’ future under the leadership of the new Queensland Reds head coach, Les Kiss, on the Rugby Unity podcast. It was apparent that Kiss faces challenges in forming a high-calibre coaching team, a situation similar to what Joe Schmidt encountered. Jones initially pointed out the struggles Australian coaching faces in nurturing its current player base.
“Joe Schmidt has mentioned the insufficient player development in Australia. While they aren’t regressing, they aren’t progressing as anticipated.”
The experienced coach from Randwick then elaborated on the composition of the Wallaby coaching staff being assembled around Kiss. It’s expected that lineout expert Tom Donnelly and skills coach Eoin Toolan will continue from the previous Schmidt era, and Kiss’s long-standing assistant, Jonathan Fisher, will likely take on the contact specialist duties previously held by Laurie Fisher. Recent reports indicate that Kiss intends to oversee and manage the Wallabies’ offensive strategy personally.
During the podcast, Jones had predicted Kiss would pursue the exact opposite approach.
“He has consistently focused on defensive coaching throughout his career. He has always instructed on the defensive aspects of the sport, so it will be intriguing to observe if he applies that defensive philosophy to the Australian squad.”
Jones recalled the strategy established by the Australian teams of the late 1990s and early 2000s, which included the significant addition of rugby league coach John Muggleton from the Paramatta Eels. Muggleton specialized in defence, and under his guidance, the Wallabies allowed only one try during their successful 1999 World Cup campaign.
“This isn’t to imply the Australian team lacked offensive capability, but their approach was heavily skewed towards defence. It will be interesting to observe if Les introduces this defensive priority to the Australian squad.”
“This will merely be a minor adjustment, a subtle alteration. However, it will be fascinating to see if it manifests. Perhaps we’ll observe increased line speed and more assertiveness from Australia, as Laurie Fisher’s previous system emphasized a more unified, connected defensive structure.”
“Essentially, there are two primary defensive strategies: prioritizing line speed or emphasizing connectivity. Australia has generally favored the latter. The question is whether Les will introduce a more assertive strategy focused on line speed, which carries inherent dangers, as it often leads to a narrower defensive alignment, potentially leaving the flanks vulnerable.”
Given Kiss’s apparent intention to ‘manage the offensive strategy,’ the most pressing requirement for the Wallabies remains unaddressed. Under Schmidt, ‘Lord’ Laurie Fisher was tasked with dual responsibilities as both a breakdown expert and defensive organizer, but any progress seen in these areas during the Lions series and Rugby Championship was negated by the November matches. Australia conceded 19 tries across four games, with 13 of those occurring in the final two encounters against Ireland and France.
Kiss’s tenure over two Super Rugby seasons with the Reds has also done little to instill faith in Queensland’s defensive capabilities.
The general trend indicates a slow deterioration, and across both seasons, the Reds demonstrated a marginally stronger offensive performance compared to their defensive showing. It appears Kiss’s coaching focus leans more towards attacking play than defensive execution.
During Schmidt’s leadership, the Wallabies maintained a traditional 12/1/2 defensive setup: 12 players in the forward line, two in the backfield, and the scrum-half covering the area between these two layers. This strategy prioritizes defensive cohesion among players, often at the expense of a more aggressive approach.
In this specific lineout situation from the match against France, two defenders are positioned deep in the backfield, while the front defensive line shifts horizontally to connect with them as the action progresses towards the opposite touchline. The scrum-half occupies the intervening area, tasked with closing any openings and fielding short kicks.
The drawback of this three-layered defensive formation lies in the vulnerable contact points presented upfront and the danger of the scrum-half becoming isolated and ineffective in the midfield.
— William Bishop (@RPvids1994) December 18, 2025
The young player, Kalvin Gourgues, bypasses a retreating Len Ikitau from the inside. In this scenario, the scrum-half would have been more effective positioned in the defensive line, offering Ikitau and his teammates additional cover in the midfield.
A persistent challenge within the Wallabies’ midfield related to the unsettled role of new arrival Joseph-Aukuso Suaalii at centre. Due to his limited background in rugby union, the former league player frequently made initial errors that proved costly for the Wallabies.
— William Bishop (@RPvids1994) December 18, 2025
— William Bishop (@RPvids1994) December 18, 2025
In the initial video segment, Suaalii adheres strictly to the principle of defensive connection, retreating and awaiting support from his inner defenders before the play extends to the far touchline. However, this process unfolds far too sluggishly: the internal defence fails to synchronize with Suaalii until the very last pass, rendering the former Rooster unable to execute a tackle, even a mere meter from his try line.
In the subsequent instance, he moves a step out of the defensive formation, a critical misstep that leaves him just one crucial stride behind the UBB speedster Louis Bielle-Biarrey as the ball reaches the right 5-meter line.
— William Bishop (@RPvids1994) December 18, 2025
— William Bishop (@RPvids1994) December 18, 2025
As ‘Drico’ pointed out with a hint of irony while commentating on the opening try, “The Australian defence coach would surely be displeased here. [Irish centre] Robbie Henshaw fumbles the ball slightly. Suaalii must hit him hard, seizing both player and ball, preventing him from regathering. Once the offload occurs, the result is inevitable.”
In the second segment, Suaalii misses by a fraction of a second from intercepting Sam Prendergast’s cross-field kick to the right, which led to Mack Hansen, formerly of the Brumbies, scoring his third try of the match. The precision required is immense; being a mere half-step too slow means failing. This instance, in a way, epitomized the former league player’s season specifically, and Schmidt’s overall Wallaby defensive efforts generally.
Rugby Australia is in critical need of a defensive coach, without delay. Schmidt tried to adapt Fisher, who is inherently a breakdown and contact expert, to a defensive system he had successfully used with Ireland. However, this never fully solidified into the reliable bedrock the Wallabies needed, especially in challenging situations. When facing stronger attacking sides, the system appeared outdated and failed to support Australia’s emerging rugby talent.
As Kiss focuses on ‘managing the offensive strategy,’ a significant void persists within the coaching team. Similar to New Zealand, which faces a coaching gap following Jason Holland’s exit, the Wallabies might be compelled to recruit internationally for the essential coaching expertise they desperately require. However, much like the All Blacks, they will likely hesitate to diverge from the established practices of Super Rugby. Nevertheless, that subject is for a future discussion, a narrative to be explored in the subsequent installment of this Southern Hemisphere two-part feature.
