A new draft lottery mechanism, dubbed “the 3-2-1 lottery,” has been put forward by the National Basketball Association to combat intentional losing. Under this novel framework, the draft lottery would broaden its scope from 14 to 16 participating teams, equalize the probabilities for securing the first overall selection, and include all 16 initial draft choices being determined through the lottery process.
The following table illustrates the allocation of lottery balls across different categories, alongside their respective probabilities for obtaining the premier draft choice:
|
# of teams |
Lottery balls |
% Odds at No. 1 |
|
|
Three worst records |
3 |
2 |
5.4% |
|
Rest of non play-in teams |
7 |
3 |
8.1% |
|
9th and 10th play-in seeds |
4 |
2 |
5.4% |
|
Losers of 7 vs. 8 play-in games |
2 |
1 |
2.7% |
This proposition incorporates teams participating in the play-in tournament. Specifically, the two teams defeated in the 7th seed versus 8th seed contests would each be granted a single lottery ball, translating to a 2.7% chance. Meanwhile, the four teams holding the 9th and 10th seed positions would each be allocated two lottery balls, giving them 5.4% odds.
A particularly notable aspect is that the three teams with the poorest records across the league would possess reduced odds (5.4%) compared to the seven other franchises that fail to qualify for both the playoffs and play-in tournament (8.1%).
These lowest-ranked three teams would be subjected to a process the NBA terms “draft relegation,” wherein they forfeit one of their allotted lottery balls to discourage deliberate underperformance. This notion of draft relegation first emerged during a general managers’ conference in early April, according to initial reports from Yahoo Sports. NBA commissioner Adam Silver reportedly expressed considerable approval for this system, citing its potential effectiveness in preventing teams from intentionally seeking the worst possible standings.
Under this plan, all sixteen selections would be determined through the lottery. However, teams designated for draft relegation would be guaranteed no worse than the 12th overall selection.
|
Draft Pick |
Bottom 3 |
Next 7 worst |
9 & 10 seeds |
7 vs. 8 losers |
|
1st |
5.4% |
8.1% |
5.4% |
2.7% |
|
2nd |
5% |
8% |
5% |
3% |
|
3rd |
6% |
8% |
6% |
3% |
|
4th |
6% |
8% |
6% |
3% |
|
5th |
6% |
8% |
6% |
3% |
|
6th |
6% |
7% |
6% |
4% |
|
7th |
6% |
7% |
6% |
4% |
|
8th |
6% |
7% |
6% |
4% |
|
9th |
6% |
7% |
6% |
4% |
|
10th |
8% |
6% |
6% |
4% |
|
11th |
14% |
4% |
5% |
4% |
|
12th |
25% |
2% |
2% |
2% |
|
13th |
7% |
9% |
8% |
|
|
14th |
6% |
9% |
10% |
|
|
15th |
5% |
9% |
15% |
|
|
16th |
3% |
7% |
27% |
My full support goes to the concept of a draft relegation tier. This change is long overdue. For two decades, the association has inadvertently encouraged teams to intentionally lose, and the rationale for discontinuing such incentives is undeniably compelling.
A common counter-argument suggests that draft relegation impedes the ability of the poorest performing franchises to emerge from a rebuilding phase. I disagree with this perspective. Over recent periods, numerous organizations led by competent management have entered the lottery and rapidly re-established themselves. Teams that remain perpetually unsuccessful, failing to improve season after season, typically share a similar underlying issue, which is not misfortune. Instead, it lies with the individuals managing those franchises. Granting increased draft opportunities to poorly run front offices would merely exacerbate the problem of deliberate losing throughout the league.
Furthermore, the relegation zone fundamentally alters the perception of defeat for the teams positioned within it. Supporters would no longer find themselves scrutinizing late-season schedules in March and April, hoping for their own squad to lose. Had this regulation been active this season, the Wizards, Pacers, and Nets would have intensely competed to escape the bottom three spots. Similarly, the Jazz, Kings, and Grizzlies would have exerted significant effort to steer clear of that category. Mavericks fans, for instance, would not have felt dismayed by victories secured in April that might have diminished their lottery chances. For the league’s struggling teams, success on the court would then carry the same positive significance it consistently holds for supporters of all other franchises.
To some extent, yes. However, this proposition does present a notable flaw. For clarity, the distribution of probabilities by potential draft pick range is outlined below:
|
#1 Odds |
Top 3 |
Top 5 |
Top 10 |
Avg Pick |
|
|
3 worst records |
5.4% |
16% |
28% |
61% |
8.1 |
|
7 remaining non play-in teams |
8.1% |
24% |
39% |
73% |
7.4 |
|
9th and 10th play-in teams |
5.4% |
16% |
28% |
59% |
9.1 |
|
2 losers of 7 vs. 8 play-in |
2.7% |
8% |
15% |
35% |
11.7 |
Evidently, the most advantageous position within the 3-2-1 Lottery system is to bypass the play-in tournament while simultaneously evading the three lowest standings. This is due to the proposal’s objective to curb deliberate losing among the league’s struggling franchises, an aim it undoubtedly achieves with the introduction of draft relegated teams.
Nevertheless, distinct disparities exist between each category. A team finishing as a ninth or tenth seed, for example, might prefer to be among the seven non-play-in teams to secure improved chances. Likewise, a seventh or eighth seed could find it more desirable to occupy the ninth or tenth position for twice the probability. Even a fifth or sixth seed might strategically aim to enter the play-in tournament.
This stratification in lottery probabilities raises concerns for me. The victors of the play-in matches secure the seventh seed and receive no opportunity in the lottery. Conversely, the defeated team retains a potential path to the postseason and a 2.7% likelihood for the first pick, an 8% chance for a top-three selection, a 15% chance for a top-five, a 35% chance for a top-ten, and a guaranteed placement within the top sixteen. This appears to represent a considerably more favorable result.
My initial preference was for the lottery to encompass 22 teams – specifically, the ten teams that do not reach the playoffs, the four teams defeated in the play-in, and the eight teams eliminated in the first round – to achieve a greater equalization of odds and diminish the sharp boundaries between categories. I believe such a system would be significantly more effective in eradicating intentional losing across all levels of the league, and I remain hopeful for its reconsideration. However, considering the league’s shift from a prior proposal of 18 teams to the current 16, its reintroduction appears improbable.
Nevertheless, the differences between these categories are sufficiently small that the NBA anticipates no team management will direct coaches to intentionally lose games in March to secure a better position. Yet, such a scenario remains a possibility. This is precisely why the proposition also incorporates a provision empowering the NBA with amplified disciplinary powers, including the right to diminish a team’s lottery probabilities or reassign its pick entirely. A franchise overtly manipulating its performance to enter or exit the play-in competition perfectly aligns with the circumstances the league envisions when drafting such language. The inherent threat serves as a preventative measure.
An additional subtlety exists, representing perhaps the most subtly impactful element of the entire proposition: no team would be permitted to secure the first overall selection in successive seasons. Furthermore, no team would be allowed to obtain three consecutive picks within the top five.
To illustrate its practical implications, consider applying this rule retrospectively: The Spurs would have acquired Victor Wembanyama in 2023 and Stephon Castle in 2024, rendering them ineligible to select Dylan Harper as the second pick in 2025. Similarly, the Pistons might have drafted Cade Cunningham in 2021 and Jaden Ivey in 2022, but would have been barred from a top-five selection for Ausar Thompson in 2023. I support a regulation designed to disrupt protracted periods of deliberate losing and to prevent a team from experiencing exceptional draft fortune over multiple consecutive years.
The “3-2-1” proposition is still a work in progress. Information from league insiders suggests that the probabilities could be adjusted, the relegation tier might be modified, and the number of lottery participants could either increase to 18 or revert to the present 14. The existing wording prohibits teams from safeguarding selections between the 12th and 15th spots, which appears to be an interim measure awaiting a more conclusive stipulation. Team owners are not scheduled to vote until May 28, and a five-week period is a substantial duration in the intricate world of league governance.
An understandable resistance exists against the league’s method, contending that it significantly complicates a team’s path to enhancement. The existing collective bargaining agreement already imposes challenges for improvement via free agency because of various salary cap thresholds. Acquiring seasoned players through trades can incur substantial costs. Occasionally, the draft presents the sole avenue for teams to ascend from the league’s lower ranks, or to transition from mediocrity to elite status. Unforeseen repercussions are likely. However, teams deliberately forfeiting matches is an deplorable practice that should never be condoned or viewed as a viable strategy.
The NBA appears to be progressing favorably. The lowest echelons of the league standings are poised to become deliberately undesirable positions. This is a positive development, and it should indeed be the case.
